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Overview
m Intellectual capital (IC) defined
m LAI-related research on IC
m Evolution of IC in design projects
m Observations from IC research
m Some ways of framing IC investment decisions
m Conclusions
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Intellectual Capital Defined
m IC is intellectual material -- knowledge, information,
intellectual property (IP), and experience -- that can
be put to use to create wealth and value
m Includes:
- employees’ skills
- patents & trade secrets
- an organization’s technologies, processes, and experience
- info about customers and suppliers
Assertion: IC, like other forms of capital, can be
made more productive through proper management
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LAI Intellectual Capital
Management Research
m The Link Between Design Problems and Intellectual
Capital Loss in Aircraft Development
m Investigate examples of increased problems in design for
possible links to intellectual capital degradation (Andrew)
m Intellectual Capital Management in the Multi-project
Environment
m Model and identify key factors affecting development and
sustainment of intellectual capital associated with project
assignments in a multi-project environment (Herweg &
Pilon)
m Assessing and Measuring Intellectual Capital
m Develop an assessment tool to support management of
and investment in intellectual capital (Seigel)
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Design
Activities
• Studies
• Tech Demo
• Operational
Systems
Financial Support
• Government Contracts
• Industry Funds
• IR&D
Institutional
Structures and
Management
Organizations
Technology
Development
Facilities
• Government
• Industry
Engineering
and
Management
Staff
1992 RAND Study: Maintaining
Aircraft Design Team Capability
Study conclusions based on historical experience unlikely to
be repeated;  What are the realistic solutions to IC challenges
potentially occurring in a significantly different future context?
Conclusion: Need $100M annually
(research and technology funding),
1,000 technical staff to maintain
adequate aircraft design team capability
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Digging Deeper Into “Design
Team Capability”
m Recent LAI study on role of IC in aircraft design:
m Setting: new commercial aircraft designs over a generation of
change in the industry
m Same target markets
m Company-funded development
m Same FARs, certification requirements
m Mature multi-product firms (with significant military business)
m Data based on interviews and extensive archival document
search
“A90”
“C90”
“A70”
“B70”
Case Studies
90s Era70s EraYear
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Data Used to Assess Design Team
Capability
m Examined detailed aircraft and program performance metrics
and their stability over the life of the development program:
m Design effectiveness: We; Useful load; payload; MTOGW; Range;
Altitude
m Design quality: Spec changes, flight test hours
m Program milestones: First flight, Type certification (VFR & IFR),
Initial delivery
m IC metrics (including):
m New aircraft designs in past 10, 20 years
m Design team staffing stability
m Individual engineering and managerial experience
m Type of experience (demonstrator vs. production a/c)
m Use of modern design tools and knowledge capture
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Comparing the Programs
m 70s programs had the following in common:
m Same period of execution, competing head to head in the same
market
m Workforce new design aircraft experience base is high
m Predominantly Paper & Mylar design tools
m Physical representations (e.g., prototypes, powered wind tunnel
models) for design validation
m Functional Organization with "heavy weight" project managers
m 90s programs had the following in common:
m Overlapping periods of execution, overlapping market segments
m Extensive use of computer aided design tools and information
technologies
m Increased reliance on simulation for design validation
m Use of IPTs
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Frequency of New Design Aircraft
Introductions in Study Firms
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Trends in each firm were similar and mirrored the
rest of this industry sector
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Illustrative Findings: A70
Performance at type certification
Metric Deviation
We (lb) +7%
MTOGW (lb) +3.1%
We/MTOGW +3.6%
Useful Load (lb) +2%
Range (nm) +4 %
First Flight +9 mo.
Type Certification +6 mo.
Initial Delivery +8 mo.
Major Specification Changes 3
Some deviation from plan observed, but overall
the best-performing program
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m Ranked performance across all 4 programs:
m Design effectiveness (i.e., weight, range, etc.)
m Design quality (i.e., ECPs , etc.)
m Program performance (i.e., milestones)
m Intellectual capital (e.g., # new designs in prior
10, 20 years, management depth, skills)
m Sum scores and check for correlation
Comparing the 4 Programs
Depth of IC is positively correlated with
design and program performance
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Study Observations
m Strong Linkage between IC metrics and Program Performance
Metrics
m 70s-era design efforts outperformed the 90s-era efforts in
meeting program/ performance objectives
m Better weight, payload margins; closer to delivery milestones
m Performance extremes were in the same company—allowing
convenient comparison
m Can address evolution of in-depth through interviews with
“graybeards” and documents
m Test phase an important downstream indicator of design
performance and IC
m Test personnel positioned to understand design system
weaknesses through exposure to recurring problems
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A Story About the Shelf Life of
Explicit Knowledge
Weight Plan Profile (WPP) Illustration
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WPP resulted from attempt to codify lessons learned
from a close military competition
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70s Era Aircraft (A70) Design
Experience
A70 Weight Empty History / Design through Certification
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Aggressive use of WPP (and other lessons learned)
by those who helped create it kept program on track
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Footnote to A70 Design
Experience
m Evolutionary derivative program 7 years later experienced
greater difficulties
m Delayed type certification
m Reduced performance (poor weight control)
m WPP tool still existed, but originating team had moved on to
new assignments
m Discipline to use WPP methodology was not as strong as in
original A70 program
m Other codified lessons learned were circumvented
Perceived relevance of captured knowledge (WPP
and others) was apparently affected by passage of
time and turnover in workforce
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90s Era Aircraft (A90) Design
Experience
“Evolutionary” design strategy de-emphasized role of
experienced air vehicle team members, with problems
appearing in and corrected during developmental test
17 - Team Initials/Presenter  - 032502 © 002 Massachusetts Institute of Technology web.mit.edu/lean
Contrasting the A70 and A90
Design Experiences
m A70:
m Management team built on senior engineering leadership
emerging from a key military program competition victory
m Hand-picked team of senior engineers with experience on multiple
programs—”fully staffed” program
m Aggressive use of lessons-learned and risk reduction strategies
(employing familiar, common tools and concepts)
m A90:
m 1 prior major program from which to draw experiences (but
housed in a separate facility
m Program leadership experience primarily with legacy/derivative
program; few key players (1-deep at times) from flight sciences
m Manufacturing quality higher as a result of advanced design tools
m Simulation tools graphically compelling, but underlying data
deficiencies (in part due to reduced reliance on wind tunnel
testing) lead to late design changes
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Summary Observations From
This Research
m Knowledge capture and/or knowledge codification methods may be
only partially effective if not backed up with experience in practice
m Prototype and experimental aircraft experience alone is inadequate
to bring a new aircraft design through certification and rate
production
m There must be adequate "critical mass" of intellectual capital—a
few stars can’t carry the entire team
m Use of modern design tools:
m Modern computational tools did not fully offset impact of intellectual
capital declines on program performance
m Failure to refresh/support knowledge systems resulted in mis-
prediction/rework that caused major delays
m Modern computational tools can inhibit development of user tacit
knowledge compared with predecessor analysis methods.
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Implications: Thinking About
Investment in IC/KM Tools
NPVIC= discounted value of future net IC contributions to
enterprise performance
Investment in people and tools may increase net IC productivity
and yield a return to the enterprise, but:
m Organizational return from knowledge creation decays with
time
m Employee turnover, new requirements, forgetfulness, etc.
m Current productivity metrics make economic justification of
IC/KM investment difficult
Productivity gains resulting
from IC/KM projects
(1 + r)i
I=1
N
=
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IC/KM Investment Aided by
Development of Better Metrics?
Two areas for development of practice/metrics:
m Efficiency:
m IC/KM reduces transaction costs by streamlining, improving
knowledge flows
m Enhances cycle time and cost outcomes
m Need metrics and tools that can assess IC/KM impact on
transaction costs (e.g., ABC/ABM)
m Effectiveness:
m IC/KM allows creation/combination of the right of knowledge to
create competitive advantage and superior products
m Enhances competitive position for future business
m Need metrics that can assess IC/KM impact on:
m Relevance of captured/stored knowledge to tasks at hand
m Ability to combine “network” knowledge into new forms to address
new requirements
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Implications: Thinking About
Investment in Knowledge Creation
m “Production breaks” make the next unit more expensive
because of “lost learning”
m IC analogy: years between exercise of design skills results in
higher costs due to relearning or mistakes not avoided
m Case studies showed that programs with broken or disrupted IC
continuity with prior programs suffered in performance and
programmatics
Learning Curves
Illustration from DoD 4245.7-M, 1985
Cn = K Ns
Unit cost (C) declines with
each additional unit
produced by a rate (S)
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Strategic Choices Around
Knowledge Creation
Illustrative knowledge creation and capture investment strategies:
m Short-term (periodic and predictable customer pull for new
products):
m Firm bridges gaps in knowledge creation activities through own
investments in development of derivatives, IRAD, productivity
enhancements
m Long-term (many years until next new design):
m Externalize cost of knowledge creation by allowing customer to
fund technology demonstrations, concept studies, and prototypes
m Customer or firm adopts “spiral” or adaptive development process
to “load level” design experience over several years
m BUT–customer acknowledges and accepts potentially significant
relearning penalties to develop follow-on new products if the break
in knowledge creation activity stretches on too long
Illustration from DoD 4245.7-M, 1985
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Concluding Points
m Research on IC continuing
m LAI: Development of model, framework, and tools
to help assess IC vitality (June 2002)
m LARA: current primary research thrust
m Focus of LAI/LARA white paper to Presidential
Commission on Future of Aerospace Industry (April
2002)
m Research scope and activity associated with
KM expected to expand in LAI follow-on phase
